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Default Rules for Contract Formation
By Promise and the Need for Revision
of the Mailbox Rule
By BETH A. EISLER*
I. THE RuLEs
The existing default rules' for contract formation by promise
generally conform, as they should, with the reasonable and prob-
able expectations of the contracting parties. 2 There is, however,
* Associate Professor, The Umversity of Toledo College of Law. A.B. 1968, J.D.
1972, The George Washington Umversity. I would like to thank David Fine for his valuable
research assistance and editing skills and Donna Hunt for her excellent secretarial support.
I also would like to thank the faculty and participants at the George Mason Umversity
School of Law, Law and Economics Center, 1990 Economics Institute for Law Professors.
Additionally, I want to express my appreciation to Doug Whaley for his helpful insight and
to my colleagues, especially Lee Pizzmenti for the time she spent discussing contract
formation with me and Jerry Moran for his sage counsel.
A default rule fills a gap in a contract. It is an implied term that gives parties the
rights and duties that they would have bargained for if they had thought to bargain. See,
e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (a discussion of default theory); see also Baird, Self-
Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583 (1990); Gillette,
Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 535 (1990); Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
This Article uses the term "default rule" to denote a rule that fills a gap, not in
contract performance, but in contract formation. Generally, parties do not negotiate in
advance with respect to the particulars concerning the formation of an enforceable contract.
Parties enter negotiations with their own perceptions of contract formation and expect the
default rules of contract formation to comport with those perceptions. See infra note 2.
2 Justice Cardozo eloquently discussed gap filling in existing contracts, and stated
that "[i]ntention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the
reasonable and the probable." Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
What is reasonable and probable depends on the circumstances as well as the experience of
the decisionmaker. This Article makes assertions concermng the expectations of the con-
tracting parties. This Article assumes that the hunches upon which it is based are correct.
Cf. A. KRONmA & R. PosNER, THE EcONOMTCS OF CoNTRrcT LAW 50-51 (1979) ("Perhaps,
then, the real reason for the law's generally not enforcing gratuitous promises is not a
belief, which would be economically unsound, that there is a difference in lnd between
the gratuitous and the bargained-for promise, but an empirical hunch that gratuitous
promises tend both to involve small stakes and to be made in family settings where there
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one exception: the rule that governs when an acceptance is effective
to create a contract. The dispatch or mailbox rule3 departs from
the parties' expectations and from a more logical rule which would
be in keeping with modern communications technology The mail-
box rule also fails to parallel existing formation default rules. For
example, unless otherwise stated, an offer, which is a manifestation
of willingness to enter into a bargain,4 has the legal effect of
creating a power of acceptance in the offeree only when the offeree
actually receives the offer.5 If the offeror decides to withdraw or
revoke the offer, the revocation generally has legal effect only
when the offeree receives the revocation. 6 In the absence of nego-
tiation, the individuals most likely would presume that the offeree
must receive the communication of the offeror's revocation before
that revocation could affect the contract formation. Furthermore,
if the parties had discussed revocation, their agreement with respect
to revocation probably would have mirrored the existing default
rule. An alternative default rule would deprive the offeree of a
dependable basis for deciding whether to accept the offer. After
are economically superior alternatives to legal enforcement."); J. WE= & R. SUaMs,
LAW UNDER TBE UNIFOiRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-24, at 610 (3d ed. 1988) ("While we
have no empirical basis for concluding the typical offeror is a chiseler as opposed to a
legitimately aggrieved debtor, we are inclined to that view.").
3 See mnfra note 23 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Day v. Amax, Inc., 701 F.2d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1983) (offer must be
a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain so as to justify the conclusion by the
offeree that his assent will conclude the bargain); 1 A. CORBIN, CoRBN ON CONrRACTS §
94 (1963 & Supp. 1990); 1 F FAxswoRTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.10 (2d ed.
1990); S. WLLSTON, A TREATISE ON TE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 23 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRACTS § 38(2) (1981).
5 Caldwell v. Cline, 156 S.E. 55 (W Va. 1930) (offer to exchange land effective on
receipt, rather than on mailing); see also Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the
Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 182-83 (1917).
Receipt here means that 1) the party or an authorized agent has come into possession
of the information or 2) the information has been put in some place which the party has
expressly or impliedly authorized as the place for deposit of the information. Cf. United
Leasing, Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Agency, Inc., 656 P.2d 1246'(Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (letter left with agent need not have been read by principal to be effective); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 68 (1981); UNIFOM CoMMERCIA, CODE § 1-201(26),
(27) (1990) [hereinafter U.C.C.].
6 See, e.g., Brauer v. Shaw, 46 N.E. 617 (Mass. 1897) (revocation must be received
to be effective); Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (C.A. 1876) (revocation must be received
to be effective); Corbin, supra note 5, at 185; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42
(1981). If, however, the offeror has made a general or public offer, the offeree need not
have actual knowledge of the revocation. See Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875)
(revocation of offer of reward for the apprehension of Lincoln assassination conspirators
need not actually have been received); Corbin, supra note 5, at 184; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 46 (1981).
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the offeror had manifested an intent to revoke, but before the
offeree received notice of the revocation, the offeree may have
expended or continued to expend resources to determine whether
to accept or may have accepted the offer. At a nmmum, the
offeror and offeree would want the offeree to be able to rely on
the offeror's onginal manifestation until the offeree received notice
of the offeror's contrary intention.
7
After receiving the offer, the offeree usually deternmnes whether
to accept or reject the offer. A rejection or a manifestation of
intent not to accept the offers terminates the offeree's power of
acceptance9 only when the offeror has received the rejection.10 The
same rule applies to a counter-offer by the offeree.'1 In the absence
of negotiation, the individuals most likely would presume that the
offeror must have received the offeree's manifestation of intent
not to accept before the rejection or counter-offer would have the
legal effect of terminating the offeree's power of acceptance. Had
the parties discussed rejection and counter-offer by the offeree,
their agreement probably would have mirrored the existing default
rule. Until the offeror receives a manifestation, that manifestation
cannot affect the offeror. In that regard, the offeror could not
7 On the other hand, it has been proposed that the offeror may reserve the power
to revoke the offer without notifying the offeree of the revocation. REsTATBmENT (SEcOND)
OF CoNTRAcTs § 42 comment b (1981). In that circumstance, the reservation of the power
by the offeror would have been known to the offeree. The reservation, therefore, would
have created an expectation in the offeree, who would adjust Ins actions accordingly.
3 See, e.g., Trautwem v. Leavey, 472 P.2d 776, 780 (Wyo. 1970) (rejection manifests
an intent not to accept an offer); 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 94, at 389-90; 1 F
FARNSWORTa, supra note 4, § 3.20, at 257; 1 S. WtusToN, supra note 4, § 51, at 164;
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 38(2) (1981).
9 See, e.g., Nabob Oil Co. v. Bay State Oil & Gas Co., 255 P.2d 513 (Okla. 1953)
(letter of rejection terminated the offeree's power of acceptance); I A. CoRBIN, supra note
4, § 94, at 389; 1 S. Wn-TON, supra note 4, § 51, at 164-65; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRACTS § 38(l) (1981).
10 See, e.g., James v. Darby, 100 F 224 (8th Cir. 1900) (letter of rejection could be
recalled until received, at which point the rejection terminated the offeree's power of
acceptance); I A. CORIN, supra note 4, § 94, at 389; 1 S. WI.ISTON, supra note 4, § 51,
at 167-68; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 38(l) (1981).
" "A counter-offer is an offer made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same
matter as the original offer and proposing a substituted bargain differing from that proposed
by the original offer." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(1). The counter-offer
terminates the offeree's power of acceptance. See, e.g., Thurmond v. Wieser, 699 S.W.2d
680, 682 (Tex. App. 1985) (prospective purchaser of land rejected an offer when he made
a counter-offer); I A. CoRBN, supra note 4, § 90, at 382-84; 1 S. WILUSTON, supra note
4, § 51, at 164-65; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(2) (1981). The counter-offer
is effective only when received by the offeror. I S. W1LLISTON, supra note 4, § 52, at 166;
RE TATE MENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 40 (1981).
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rely on the rejection until receipt. Likewise, the offeror could not
understand that the offeree's counter-offer terminates the offeree's
power of acceptance until the offeror has actually received the
commumcation.12
If, however, the offeree has determined to accept the offer, the
offeree must manifest assent to the terms of the offer. 3 Initially,
2 See RSTATE ENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 40 comment a (1981).
Of course, the parties can agree that the offeree need not commumcate the rejection
or counter-offer to the offeror m order to terminate the offeree's power of acceptance. In
that circumstance, the offeror would continue to assume that the offeree is still deciding
how to proceed. At some point, the offer would lapse. Before lapse, if the offeror wanted
to know the status of the offer with respect to the offeree, the offeror would have to
commumcate with the offeree. Usually, though, an offeror who has not heard from an
offeree will assume that the offeree has not yet decided whether to exercise the power of
acceptance. Additionally, the parties can agree that a rejection or a counter-offer does not
manifest an intent not to accept. In that circumstance, the offeror could not rely on the
rejection or counter-offer as a termination of the offeree's power of acceptance.
" See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 comment c (1981).
The manifestation of assent must be in the manner invited or required by the offeror.
See, e.g., Cillessen v. Kona Co., 387 P.2d 867 (N.M. 1964) (all terms for acceptance of an
option contract must be strictly followed); 1 A. ConN, supra note 4, § 70, at 288-91; 1
S. WIL=STON, supra note 4, §§ 65, 78A; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1)
(1981). Usually, the offeror is indifferent with respect to the method of the offeree's
acceptance and the offeree may manifest assent either by promising to perform or by
performing that which was requested by the offeror. See, e.g., Gleeson v. Frahm, 320
N.W.2d 95, 97 (Neb. 1982) (when offer did not specify mode of acceptance, a promise
contained in a letter manifested acceptance); 1 A. CoRnmr, supra note 4, § 77; 1 S.
WnISTON, supra note 4, § 78A; REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) oF CORAcTS §§ 32, 50 comment
a (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1990). The manifestation, if by promise, may be
made by words, oral or written, or by conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 50 comment c (1981). Moreover, the conduct may be an act of performance. See, e.g.,
Signst v. Century 21 Corp., 519 P.2d 362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (substantial performance
amounted to acceptance); 1 A. CoRBIN, supra note 4, § 63; 1 S. WnILTON, supra note 4,
§ 78A; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 32, 50 comment c (1981).
Generally, the offeree's silence or inaction will not manifest assent to the offer. See,
e.g., Karlin v. Avis, 457 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972)
(silence not acceptance); 1 A. CoRBiN, supra note 4, § 72, at 304; 1 S. WIL.ISTON, supra
note 4, § 9.1, at 319-20; REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). Rarely, the
offeree may be deemed to have accepted the offeror's offer by doing or saying nothing.
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRACTS § 69(1) (1981). For example, if the parties, through
their course of dealing, have agreed that the offeree's silence or inaction constituted a
manifestation of assent to the terms of previous offers, then the offeree's later silence or
inaction also may be deemed to be an acceptance of a similar offer. See, e.g., Hobbs v.
Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893) (retention of animal slins was acceptance
when that had become the practice of the parties); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 69(1)(c) (1981).
In the absence of negotiation, the individuals most likely would presume that the
offeree must manifest assent in the manner required by the offeror, and, if no manner is
specified, the offeree could manifest assent either by promising to perform or by performing
that which was bargained for by the offeror. Additionally, had the parties discussed the
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an acceptance by promise requires that the offeree complete every
act essential to the making of the promise. 14 In addition to the
manifestation of assent, the offeree must notify or commumcate
to the offeror the fact that the offeree has manifested assent by
promise.1 5 In the absence of negotiation, the individuals most likely
would presume that the offeror actually must receive notification
of the offeree's manifestation of assent by promise before either
party would be bound to the contract. If the parties had discussed
the offeree's acceptance by promise, their agreement would prob-
ably have mirrored their individual expectations that the offeror
must actually receive the offeree's promise. That, however, is not
the existing default rule. 16
Although parties might presume or agree that receipt of the
notification of the manifestation by promise is required, absent an
express agreement to that effect, most Anglo-American courts have
decided that the offeror need not receive the notice in order to
create a contract. 17 Rather, the offeree need only exercise reason-
able diligence to notify the offeror of the offeree's acceptance.'
What constitutes reasonable diligence may differ according to
the circumstances. If the parties are in the presence of each other,
courts expect that the offeror will actually receive the notice of the
promise.' 9 Courts have not had to determine what constitutes rea-
offeree's manifestation of assent, their agreement probably would have mirrored the existing
default rule. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
"4 See 1 A. CoRnN, supra note 4, §§ 63, 70; 1 S. WMsTotrN, supra note 4, § 65;
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 50(3) (1981).
11 See, e.g., Lloyd & Elliott v. Parke, 157 A. 272 (Conn. 1931) (acceptance became
effective when means were set m motion to convey acceptance to offeror); 1 A. CoRBNm,
supra note 4, § 67, at 275; 1 S. Wn.uswoN, supra note 4, § 70; REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTS § 56 (1981).
16 "There is no umversal doctnne of the common law that acceptance of an offer
must be communicated. "Lennox v. Murphy, 50 N.E. 644, 645-46 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes,
J.).
'" See, e.g., United Leasing, 656 P.2d at 1250 (counter-offer was accepted when
reasonable diligence was used to communicate the acceptance); Lloyd & Elliott, 157 A. at
272 (acceptance effective when means set m motion to convey acceptance to offeror); 1 A
CoanN, supra note 4, § 67; 1 S. Wu.USToN, supra note 4, §§ 70-72; RESTATEMrNT (SECOND)
oF CONTRACTS § 56 comments a and b (1981).
"1 See, e.g., Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So. 2d 167, 169-70 (Fla. 1972) (offeree must
make a reasonable effort to communicate to offeror notice of acceptance); 1 A. CoaNm,
supra note 4, § 67, at 109; 1 S. W111sSTON, supra note 4, §. 70, at 230; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 56 comment b (1981).
"1 See, Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp., 2 Q.B. 327 (C.A. 1955) (whereas
acceptance by mail is effective upon dispatch, acceptance by instantaneous commumcation
is effective upon receipt by offeror); I A. CoRniN, supra note 4, § 79 (compares acceptance
1990-91]
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sonable diligence when the parties are in the presence of each other
because in such a situation the offeror immediately learns of the
manifestation. In a decision of the Queen's Bench, Justice Dennmg
posited that, in the instantaneous situation, reasonable diligence
should not be adequate because it is no burden for the offeree to
ascertain whether his acceptance actually has been received. 2w In
those instances, he wrote, actual notification should be required.
For example, assume the offeror and the offeree were discussing
their bargain at the Ohio State-Michigan football game. At the
precise moment when the offeree said "I promise," assume that
the public address system blared out the score (with the Wolvennes
suitably ensconsed in the lead). Assume that the offeror did not
hear the offeree's words. Justice Dening would argue that no
contract had been formed because the offeree should have been
aware that the offeror actually had not received notice of the
offeree's manifestation of assent by promise.21
If, as is the usual circumstance, the parties are at a distance,
the offeree's manifestation of assent by promise is effective as soon
as the offeree puts notice of acceptance out of his possession and
into the invited or reasonable channel of communication. 2 The
current default rule governing acceptance by promise when the
by telephone to acceptance in the presence of the offeror); 1 S. WimLSToN, supra note 4, §
82A, at 271 ("[T]he time or place of the formation of the contract is not when or where
the offeree speaks, but when or where the offeror hears, or ought to hear the acceptance.");
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64 (1981) ("Acceptance given by telephone or
other medium of substantially instantaneous two-way communication is governed by the
principles applicable to acceptance where the parties are in the presence of each other.").
Entores, 2 Q.B. at 332.
21 Id. at 332; see also I A. CoiwN, supra note 4, § 79; 1 S. WMuISTON, supra note
4, § 82A; RESTATEm:ENT (SECOND) OF CONTIRTS § 64 comment b (1981).
See, e.g., Momson v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (accep-
tance is effective upon being placed in the channel of communication and not upon receipt);
Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818) (established rule); 1 A. CoRnN, supra
note 4, §§ 78-81, 88; 1 F FAR~swoRT, supra note 4, § 3.22; 1 S. WmUSTON, supra note
4, §§ 81-89; REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS f 63(a) (1981).
There are, however, many qualifications to this rule. For example, if the offeree does
not send the notice through the invited or reasonable means of transmission, or the offeree
fails to use reasonable diligence, the notice is effective upon dispatch only if the notice is
received by the offeror within the time in which a properly dispatched acceptance would
have arrived. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 66, 67 (1981). Moreover, if the
offeror receives knowledge that the offeree manifested assent to the offer, even though the
offeree never sent a communication to the offeror, the acceptance is probably effective
when received. See Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Fin. Corp., 317 F Supp. 1173, 1179 n.1
(S.D. Tex. 1970), modified, 458 F 2d 688 (1972) (offeree need not personally notify offeror
of acceptance if offeror learns promptly from some source); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRACTS § 56 comment b, at 142 (1981).
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parties are not in the presence of each other is labeled the "dispatch
rule" or "mailbox rule."'  The dispatch rule states that as soon as
the acceptance is released from the offeree's possession and placed
into the channel of communication, the acceptance is effective.24
Under the existing default dispatch rule, the offeror need not
actually receive the notice sent by the offeree.25
The English and American courts differ with respect to the
appropriate default rul26 when the parties are at a distance and
the offeree decides to notify the offeror by telephone, teletype, or
other substantially instantaneous methods of communication.27 In
England, the courts have held that when the offeree accepts by
teletype, the parties must use the same communication rules as if
the parties were in the presence of each other.2 The English courts
hold acceptance by teletype effective only when received by the
offeror.29 American courts, in contrast, have held that an accep-
tance by telephone or teletype is effective when dispatched by the
offeree with no necessity of receipt. 30
23 Worms v. Burgess, 620 P.2d 455, 457-58 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (acceptance, though
never received, was deemed adequate because it had been sent according to the "dispatch
rule").
14 Some commentators argue that the contract is created immediately, that is, when
the offeree manifests assent to the terms of the bargain. The notice requirement, therefore,
constitutes a condition subsequent, which discharges the offeror if the offeree does not
exercise diligence to notify the offeror. See, e.g., F FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.14; see
supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
2 United Leasing, 656 P.2d at 1250; F FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.22; RESTATE-
mNT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRACTs § 63(a) (1981).
2 All cases in which the offeree notified the offeror by telephone or teletype address
issues concerning place of contracting for jurisdiction purposes. See, e.g., Ledbetter Erection
Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 1097, 203 Cal. Rptr. 396,
400 (1984); Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 139 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1958); Entores, 2
Q.B. 327.
" No cases that discuss notification by facsimile machine [hereinafter fax] or electronic
data interchange [hereinafter EDI] were found.
Fax is a process of sending a document's data from one point to another so that the
receiver's machine provides what appears to be a photocopy of the document. The trans-
mission is accomplished through telephone lines and is usually virtually instantaneous.
EDI is a method by which parties communicate electronically between computers in
standardized formats. Recently, EDI has been expanded by businesses to enable the purchase
and sale of goods. In addition, parties are beginning to negotiate contracts through EDI.
Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and Commentary, 45 Bus.
LAWYER 1717 (1990) [hereinafter Agreement].
Entores, 2 Q.B. at 330.
29 Id. at 329 (the place of contracting was where the teletyped acceptance was received).
"o See, e.g., Ledbetter, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 400 (contract by telephone formed where
offeree uttered acceptance); Linn, 139 A.2d at 640 (acceptance by telephone creates a
KENucKiy LAW JOURNAL
The existing default dispatch rule does not conform with the
reasonable and probable expectations of the parties in that con-
tracting parties expect that their communications will have legal
effect only when received by the other party 31 Moreover, the
parties expect that the first communication received will have legal
priority. 2 These private expectations usually serve the parties well.33
However, when a dispute arises34 and the parties seek legal advice,
they learn that the existing legal default rules do not mirror their
expectations of what the law will provide.
II. TnE PROPOSAL
This Article proposes that the existing common law default rule
governing contracts formed by promise when the parties are at a
distance be changed so that acceptance is effective not on dispatch
by the offeree but only upon actual receipt by the offeror. Addi-
tionally, the default rule governing instantaneous and substantially
instantaneous communication should mirror the English rule, which
states that an acceptance is effective when received by the offeror.
Receipt here means that 1) the offeror or an authorized agent has
come into possession of the information or 2) the information has
been put in some place which the offeror has expressly or impliedly
authorized as the place for deposit of the information .3
The existing default rule governing acceptance by promise when
the parties are at a distance seems rarely to enter into the process
of contract formation. First, contract formation by promise gen-
contract at the place where the offeree speaks).
It should be noted that no Amencan court has followed the Restatement default rule,
which treats acceptance by telephone as a situation in which the parties are in the presence
of each other. REsTATErTr (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 64 (1981).
31 Support for this proposition comes from discussions with individuals unschooled in
the law. Lay people usually try to make certain that their commumcations actually are
received so as to bind the other party. Moreover, we often hear an offeree say that he
called the offeror or faxed his acceptance, instead of mailing it, in order to create a contract
as quickly as possible. See also infra note 78.
32 Id.
3 Professor Macaulay found that, as a general matter, contracting parties may be
unaware of the law -affecting their transaction. Moreover, even if they know the law,
business people especially have little use for the law. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations
in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rnv 55, 58-59 (1963); see also Femman,
The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. Rnv 1283, 1304-1308 (1990); Macaulay,
An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. Ray 465.
-1 See infra notes 101-51 and accompanying text.
3 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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erally runs smoothly 36 Second, until the parties seek legal advice,
their presumptions or expectations of the existing law will govern
their disposition of any formation dispute that may arise.3 7 Why,
then, change the default rule?3 First, the rule is just plain wrong.
It is not supported by logic. 39 The rule gives an unbargained-for
advantage to the. offeree and is out of sync with modem methods
of communumcation. 41 The rule mirrors neither other existing rules
of contract formation 2 nor the reasonable and probable expecta-
tions of the parties. 43 Nor does the rule mirror existing statutory
rules of contract formation" or proposed models of contract for-
mation.4 The existing rule is also economically inefficient." The
rule also does not facilitate the production of evidence.4 7 Finally,
the party less capable of ensuring against a loss now bears the
burden of commumcation.
48
Many courts and commentators have attacked the dispatch
rule.49 Others have supported it.5° All, however, have admitted that
16 A search of Westlaw's Allfeds and Allstates databases revealed only 57 cases that
discussed the "mailbox rule" in the last several decades. (The query was "Mailbox/i rule").
A search of Lexis's Genfed (Courts) and States (Omni) files revealed only 58 such cases.
(The query was the same). Both searches were conducted on October 29, 1990.
11 This second reason is based on a hunch. Probably there are two reasons why there
is little litigation concermng commumcation of acceptances by promise. First, acceptances
rarely get lost and parties rarely change their minds. Second, the parties may settle their
disputes according to their expectations.
38 In addition to the many significant arguments in favor of the change, there is
another, less weighty, benefit: myriad first-year law students would appreciate some added
sense of consistency in the law they study.
3' See infra notes 51-54 and 72 and accompanying text.
,0 See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
42 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
- See mfra note 79 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
4" See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955)
(bidder allowed to withdraw mistaken bid by telephone before arrival of mailed acceptance);
Dick v. United States, 82 F Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (ability to remove postal matter from
the mail after posting should negate the mailbox rule); 2 C.C. LA-oDELL, SUMMARY OF THE
LAW OF CoNTRaAcTs § 14 (1880); 1 S. W=isTON, supra note 4, § 81, at 226; Evans, The
Anglo-American Mailing Rule: Some Problems of Offer and Acceptance in Contracts by
Correspondence, 15 INT'L & Compi. L.Q. 553 (1966); Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too
Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. Rnv 947 (1964); Samek, A Reassessment
of the Present Rule Relating to Postal Acceptance, 35 AusT. L.J. 38 (1961); see also
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the original rationale for the dispatch rule no longer exists. 51 The
rule sometimes was justified on an agency theory: the courts de-
termined that the post office or other dispatch office acted as the
agent of the offeror.5 2 Additionally, the offeree could not get back
the letter of acceptance once it was sent.53 The latter rationale no
longer exists because the offeree now has the ability to retrieve the
letter from the post office.5
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts favor
the dispatch rule because the rule affords the offeree a dependable
basis for deciding whether to accept. 55 The drafters argue that if
the offeree has not received notice that hIs power to accept has
been terminated, the offeree should be assured that a contract has
been created as soon as the offeree dispatches the notice of his
acceptance.5 6 The Restatement rule makes the offer irrevocable
upon dispatch of the acceptance." That irrevocability binds the
offeror even when the offeror is unaware of the acceptance.
The offeree should not receive this unexpected and unbar-
gained-for protection. If the offeree wants the protection of an
irrevocable offer, the offeree should be required to obtain an
McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., I Pick 278 (Mass. 1822) (decided before court saw decision
in Adams v. Lindsell; acceptance of offer of insurance effective on receipt).
SMorrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Reserve Ins. Co.
v. Duckett, 238 A.2d 536 (Md. 1968) (acceptance effective when placed in post box); Worms
v. Burgess, 620 P.2d 455 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980); Adams v. Lmdsel, 106 Eng. Rep. 250
(K.B. 1818); Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YAua L.J.
779, 795 (1939).
" See 1 A. Coam, supra note 4, § 78, at 335; S. WusroN, supra note 4, § 81, at
266-67; see also commentators cited supra note 49.
12 Cf. Samek, supra note 49, at 39 ("Today it would seem to be recognized that the
post office is not an agent of the parties at all, but a public institution.").
11 See, e.g., Rhode Island Tool, 128 F Supp. at 417 (discusses the rationale long cited
for the mailbox rule that a letter, once mailed, could not be retrieved and that, therefore,
mailing an acceptance was a definitive manifestation of assent); see also RESTATEmENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNmAcTs § 63 comment a (1981).
s See Dick, 82 F Supp. 326 (citing postal regulations permitting retrieval of mail by
sender); Rhode Island Tool, 128 F Supp. 417. (citing postal regulations that permit with-
drawal by sender of letter deposited in the mails); Morello v. Growers Grape Prods. Ass'n.,
186 P.2d 463 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (citing state codification of dispatch rule).
1 RSATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNmAcTs § 63 comment a (1981); see also Worms,
620 P.2d at 457.
56 Id.
" Civil law countries also make an offer irrevocable upon dispatch of an acceptance.
The acceptance, however, is not effective until received by the offeror. See, e.g., 2 R.
SCHLESINGER, FoRMATioN OF CONTRACTS-A STUDY OF THE CoMMON CoPE OF LEoAL SYSTEMS
1446-1463 (French), 1464-1473 (Austrian, German, Swiss) (1968); Eorsi, Problems of Uni-
fying Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J.
Comp. L. 311, 317-519 (1979).
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option from the offeror. 8 Additionally, the offeree can always
protect the intent to create a bargain by instantaneously commu-
mcating the acceptance to the offeror. The offeree can telephone
or use a facsimile macine to communicate with the offeror or
transmit the acceptance via electronic data interchange. 9 A sub-
stantially instantaneous communication would create a contract
when received by the offeror, nearly at the same moment as when
dispatched by the offeree.60
Detractors may argue that instantaneous communication is ex-
traordinary and expensive. The mere prevalence of high technology
equipment capable of instantaneous or near instantaneous com-
mumcation belies that notion. American and international telecom-
mumcation companies are every day expanding their capabilities.
As early as 1983, MCI Telecommunications introduced a system
called MCI Mail, which linked people in the United States with
people in 80 foreign countries by electronic mail,, fax, telex, and
courier delivery.61 In less than five years, fax machines have changed
the pace of document delivery worldwide. When South African
Nelson Mandela negotiated his release from twenty-seven years in
prison, he communicated with the Pretoria government through a
fax machine .62 Climbers on a 1988 expedition to the summit of
Mount Everest (some 29,000 feet) sent back progress reports via a
fax machine attached to a cellular telephone. 63 In November, 1990,
during Operation Desert Shield, American soldiers stationed in
U Strictly, an option may be used to refer to any power to make a choice. See, e.g.,
REsrATEmENT (SEcoN) OF CoNTRAcTS § 25 comment a (1981). This Article uses "option"
and "option contract" interchangeably to mean only an enforceable promise that limits the
offeror's power to revoke the offer. The option contract must meet the requirements of a
contract in that the offeror's promise of irrevocability must be supported by a validation
device. The validation device may be consideration, but also may consist merely of a signed
writing. Cf. N.Y. GEN. OBLio. L. § 5-1109 (McKinney 1989); U.C.C. § 2-205 (1990) ("firm
offer" defined). Additionally, the offeree's reliance on the offeror's promise of irrevocability
may make the offer irrevocable. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNT rrAcs § 90 (1981); see
also Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (reasonable reliance before
acceptance made the offer irrevocable); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACrS § 87(2)
(1981).
19 See supra note 27 for a description of fax and EDI.
Nothing is certain but phones and faxes. With apologies to Benjamin Franklin,
who on November 13, 1789, wrote to Jean Baptiste Le Roy: "In this world, notlung can
be said to be certain, except death and taxes."
61 PR Newswire, Sept. 25, 1990 (available on Nexis).




Saudi Arabia used fax machines to vote for candidates in their
home towns across the United States.64
The growing demand for fax machines has brought the price
of the equipment into an affordable range. Fax machines sell at a
purchase price of approximately $400. A similar machine would
have cost more than $1,200 just five years ago. If the sender owns
the machine, transmission of a document costs merely the price of
the long-distance toll charge.
65
English jurists have justified the dispatch rule by labeling it as
a rule of convemence. 6 As was pointed out in Adams v Lindsell,67
the courts determined that, on the grounds of expediency, offerors
impliedly dispense with actual notification of acceptance when the
parties are at a distance. Unless this were so, argued the courts,
"no contract could ever be completed by the post.'"6 If the offer-
ee's acceptance were not effective until received by the offeror, the
offeror would have to notify the offeree that the offeror had
received the offeree's notification of acceptance. 69 In order for the
offeror to be certain that the offeree had received the offeror's
notice, the offeree would have to notify the offeror that the offeree
had received the offeror's notification that the offeror had received
the offeree's acceptance. 70 In order for the parties not to go on in
this way ad infinitum, the English courts determined that when the
parties are at a distance, the balance of convemence dictates that
the contract is complete when the acceptance is put into the channel
of communication, placing the burden of doubt on the offeror.71
It is submitted that the current dispatch rule is no more con-
vement than the proposed default rule. Under the proposed rule,
the advantage is merely shifted from the offeree to the offeror,
but that shift is logical and reasonable. Because substantially in-
stantaneous methods of communication are now so inexpensive
and common,72 the burden should be placed on the offeree if he
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 6, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
Conversation with a salesperson from Sharp Electronics, Oct. 24, 1990.
"Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp., 2 Q.B. 327 (C.A. 1955) citing In re Imperial
Land Co., L.R. 7 Ch. 587, 594 (1872); Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216
(1879); Dunlop v. Higgins, 9 Eng. Rep. 805, 808 (1848) (contract accepted by posting letter
declaring acceptance); Adams, 106 Eng. Rep. 250.





7 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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refuses to take advantage of these modes of commumcation. If an
offeree refuses to use telephone, fax, EDI or other substantially
instantaneous methods of commuication, the offeree's conven-
ience should not be protected. A contract should be formed when
the offeror receives the acceptance, not when the offeree dispatches
the acceptance.
The proposed default rule is justified because the requirement
of receipt of commumcation is both reasonable and probable.7 3 Is
it not reasonable for the parties to expect that the default rule that
governs acceptance would be the same as the default rules that
govern offer, revocation, and rejection? An offeree must receive
the offeror's offer.74 An offeree must receive the offeror's revo-
cation.7 An offeror must receive the offeree's rejection. 6 Moreo-
ver, is it not reasonable for the parties to expect that the default
rule govermng acceptance would be the same as the default rule
that governs acceptance by silence? An offeree's silence or inaction
is not a manifestation of assent. 7 It is manifestly unreasonable to
presume that an offeror expects that the offeree may create a
contract without the offeror actually receiving notice of the offer-
ee's manifestation of assent to the terms of the offer.
78
Additionally, the proposed receipt default rule nurrors the ex-
isting common law rule with respect to acceptance of an option.
When an offeree accepts an offer under an option contract, courts
find that a contract is not created until the offeror receives the
acceptance .79
Moreover, the proposal comports with the default rule adopted
by the Model Electromc Data Interchange Trading Partner Agree-
ment proposed by the Electromc Messaging Services Task Force of
the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. 0
Section 2.1 of the Model Agreement provides that no documents
73 See supra note 2.
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 13.
" One businessman, with no legal background, likened the unreceived acceptance to
the proverbial "tree in the forest." In essence, he asked, "If an acceptance is put into the
channels of commumcation but no one receives it, does it make a contract?"
" E.g., River City Dev. Corp. v. Slemmer, 781 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. App. 1989) (receipt
of acceptance required in option); Romain v. A. Howard Wholesale Co., 506 N.E.2d 1124
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (same); RESTATEiMNT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 63(b) (1981).
0Agreement, supra note 27, § 2.1, at 1732.
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create legal obligations until properly received.81 That section es-
sentially abolishes the existing default dispatch rule and adopts the
proposed receipt rule.
An important additional rationale for the proposed change is
that it would remove a significant variation between the law of the
United States and the laws of most European nations. As Justice
Denning wrote:
In a matter of this kind, however, it is very important that
the countries of the world should have the same rule. I find that
most of the European countries have substantially the same rule
as that I have stated. Indeed, they apply it to contracts by post
as well as instantaneous communications. But in the United States
of America it appears as if instantaneous communications are
treated in the same way as postal communications. In view of
this divergence, I tink that we must consider the matter on
principle: and so considered, I have come to the view I have
stated, and I am glad to see that Professor Winfield in this
country ., and Professor Williston in the United States of
America ., take the same view 82
The proposal also parallels the default rule adopted in the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods.83 According to article 18 of that document, an accep-
tance of an offer is effective when the manifestation of assent
reaches the offeror. 4 In addition, a contract is created when the
81 Id.
' Entores, 2 Q.B. 327. In a world so closely linked by commumcations technology
and trade agreements, a uniform rule would seem an imperative.
" United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF 97/18 Annex 1 (1980) [hereinafter U.N.C.I.S.G.].
" U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 18(2). The Convention adopted the civil law rule
rather than the common law rule. For a discussion of the complexities of developing a
uniform contract law for use among common law countries and civil law countries, see
Eorsi, supra note 57, at 315-16. See also Note, Unification and Certainty: The United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HAnv. L. Rnv.
1984, 1995-1996 (1984).
The proposed default rule carries with it, then, the additional benefit of allowing
American compames to apply the same default rule in domestic contracts as they would
apply, under the U.N.C.I.S.G., in international contracts. The proposed rule would simplify
contracting between American compames and those in. countries applying the civil law. It
also would remove an incentive for forum shopping by litigating parties.
The proposed rule differs from the U.N.C.I.S.G. and the civil law rule in one notable
way: the U.N.C.I.S.G. and the civil law provide that an acceptance, once dispatched, makes
the offer irrevocable. The importance of this difference in rules becomes nmmal when one
considers that instantaneous commumcation is now the norm. The difference would have
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acceptance is effective, that is, when the acceptance is received by
the offeror8 5
Economists agree that efficient contracting encompasses com-
munication between the parties.M If offeror and offeree can com-
municate openly, they can negotiate their own default rules. That
communication, however, is efficient only when both negotiating
parties are aware of their basic rights and duties. When both the
offeror and the offeree expect that the offeror must actually receive
the offeree's acceptance before the parties are bound by a contract,
no negotiation on that issue will occur. Adoption of the proposed
default rule will permit parties to form contracts efficiently since
they generally will not need to expend resources to negotiate a
change from their expectations.87
Detractors may argue that the evidentiary aspects of this pro-
posal would be a detriment to proving contract formation by
promise. Many times a substantive rule is based on the parties'
abilities to provide evidence of the existence of substantive facts. 88
Arguably, dispatch is peculiarly within the knowledge of the offeree
and dispatch should be the rule. Receipt is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the offeror. As between the offeree, who knows
whether the acceptance was sent, and the offeror, who knows
whether the acceptance was received, who should prevail? If the
proposal were adopted, the offeror would prevail and the offeree
would have the burden of determining whether the offeror received
the acceptance. Such a burden would be slight and much less than
the burden put on the offeror under the existing default dispatch
rule. If the parties used the telephone, the risk of transmission
failure would be small because both parties would know or have
reason to know of any failure. 89 The risk of transmission problems
little relevance outside a situation in wich an offeree sent his acceptance and an offeror
attempted to revoke the offer before receiving the acceptance. If commumcation of the
acceptance were instantaneous, the question of whether the offer could be revoked would
be moot. See infra notes 96 and 116-19.
* U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 23.
U See, e.g., R. COASE, THE Frm THE MAR= AND TnE LAW (1988).
Of course, if they wanted, the parties would be able to negotiate a change from
the proposed default rule. See generally A. KomuN1 & R. Postium, supra note 2, at 1-7.
u For example, courts adopt the presumption that if goods are damaged in transit, it
is the last carrier who caused the damage. It is assumed that the last carrier will notify the
former carrier if the goods were damaged when received. If that last carrer, who would
have knowledge of the condition of the g6ods, did not notify the former carrer, it is
presumed that the last carrier caused the damage.
"See, e.g., Entores, 2 Q.B. 327; RETATE-ETr (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTS § 64 comment
b (1981); see also supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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with a fax, likewise, is mimmal. Many fax machines signal the
sender (here the offeree) when the message (here the acceptance)
has arrived at the receiver's machine. 9° With respect to EDI, the
Electronic Messaging Service Task Force of the Section of Business
Law of the American Bar Association included in the EDI Model
Agreement a provision that requires the receiver to verify receipt
of any document by promptly transmitting an acknowledgment to
the sender. 91
Another positive evidentiary aspect of this proposal is that the
proposal limits the legal effect of a false allegation of dispatch of
an acceptance, or of a false allegation of the time when the
acceptance was dispatched. Many businesses have their own postage
meters that postmark letters sent. It is possible for the postage
meter postmark to be incorrectly dated.92 An incorrect meter date
would allow an offeree to claim that a letter of acceptance was
dispatched, thus creating a contract, earlier than it actually was
dispatched. If the contract were not created until the offeror re-
ceived the letter of acceptance, a fraudulent claim by the offeree
that a letter had been sent earlier than it actually had been would
have little legal effect. Additionally, if an acceptance were tele-
phoned, faxed, or sent by other substantially instantaneous com-
mumcation, misstating the time at which the communication was
dispatched would be difficult. Detractors will argue that under the
proposed default rule the ability to misstate the time of commu-
mcation merely is shifted to the offeror, who could allege that the
acceptance was received at a different time than it was. Under the
proposed rule, a check on the offeror exists. First, many electromc
messages, either fax or EDI, are automatically imprinted with the
time and date of receipt.93 Second, the receiver could be required
9Most fax machines offer this feature. For those who own machines that do not, a
simple request for a return fax would suffice for verification of receipt.
9! Agreement, supra note 27, § 2.2, at 1734. Failure to receive a verification would
put the original sender on notice that the communication may not have been received.
Failure to send a verification would be a breach of the agreement by the receiver who failed
to send a verification. Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of
Electronic Data Interchange-A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus.
LAw. 1645, 1667-1671 (1990) [hereinafter Report].
In Amnnoff & Co. v. Varity Corp., No. 89-CV-70002-DT (E.D. Mich. 1989), the
court discussed the issue of an incorrect postage meter postmark in order to deterrmne
whether a contract had been formed. In that case, the post office had recancelled the letter,
thus proving that the postmark was false. See also Nielson, Post-dated Postmarks, Or,
How To Mail A Letter Yesterday, 46 A.B.A. J. 949 (1960).
91 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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to send a verification of receipt.94 The offeree would know when
the acceptance was dispatched, and a presumption that the accep-
tance was received within the amount of time usual for the given
medium would exist. In that circumstance, an offeror could not
claim that the acceptance was not timely received. 95
The proposal is fair to both parties. Under the existing default
dispatch rule, the offeree receives an unbarganed-for advantage
because the offeror is unable to revoke an offer once the acceptance
has been put out of the possession of the offeree and into the
proper channel of commumcation." The offeree has the advantage
because he is aware of the contract before the offeror. Some would
argue that the offeree has a basis for performance and can begin
performing under the contract. 97 The contrary argument is that the
offeror has no basis for understanding that a contract has been
formed. Who then should benefit? If the offeree wants such a
basis for understanding that the contract has been created, the
offeree should either communicate with the offeror as quickly as
possible using a substantially instantaneous method of
commumcation98 or negotiate for an option that is irrevocable and
is not affected by the offeree's rejection or the offeror's revoca-
tion.9
The real issue is who should bear the burden of communication.
The offeree should bear the burden unless the parties otherwise
agree because the offeree has the opportunity to ensure that the
acceptance is instantaneously commiumcated to the offeror. The
offeror can only ensure against a loss by insisting on a certain
medium of commumcation. Usually, an offeror does not state such
requirements in the offer, probably because he expects that the
offeree would bear the risk with respect to failure of commumca-
tion.
. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
91 It is possible, though not probable, that the acceptance will fail in its communication
through the substantially instantaneous method.
9 In this regard, the proposal differs from the civil law and from the United Nations
Convention, both of which make an offer irrevocable once the acceptance has been dis-
patched. See U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 16(1); see also Eorsi, supra note 57, at 316.
" See Samek, supra note 49, at 41-42.
"See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Some would argue that the advantage to the offeree is no different than the advantage
given to the offeree under RESTAT EMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRAcrs §§ 45, 89 (1981). They
are correct. Nevertheless, those rules also give an unbargained-for advantage to the offeree.
That advantage should not be given.
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Some have argued that the default rules concerning commum-
cation are too broad, that one rule cannot adequately be applied
to all circumstances. 1 00 The remainder of this Article analyzes the
existing common law default rules, the existing statutory rules and
the proposed change. This analysis proves that a single default
rule, a rule of receipt, can and should govern contract formation
by promise.
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL
Example One: Offer - Acceptance - Revocation
On May 1, Offeror, at a distance from Offeree, mailed Offeree
a letter offering to employ Offeree for the next six months at $100
per week. On May 5, Offeree received the offer On May 7, Offeree
mailed Offeror a letter of acceptance. On May 10, Offeror received
Offeree's acceptance. On May 11, Offeror mailed to Offeree a
letter of revocation withdrawing the offer. On May 15, Offeree
received Offeror's revocation.
According to the existing default dispatch rule, a contract was
formed on May 7 when Offeree sent the letter of acceptance to
Offeror. 10' Had the transaction involved the sale of goods, it would
have been governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.' °2 The
Code, however, does not explicitly provide for a time when an
acceptance becomes effective. In that circumstance, the common
law default dispatch rule most likely would have applied, 3 and
the acceptance would have been effective on May 7
If this were an international transaction for the sale of goods,
the United Nations Convention would apply 104 According to the
Convention, Offeree's acceptance would have been effective on
May 10 when Offeror received the acceptance. 05 If this were a
transaction using EDI, under the Model Agreement the acceptance
likewise would have been effective upon receipt.1 6
If the proposed default receipt rule were adopted, it would
apply to transactions under the Code as well as to all other trans-
t00 Macneil, supra note 49, at 950.
10 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
I- U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-105 (1990).
303 U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990) (unless otherwise displaced, provisions of the Code are
supplemented by the common law).
"' See U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 1.
105 Id. at art. 18(2).
106 Agreement, supra note 26, § 2.1, at 1732.
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actions not covered by the Code. 1' May 10 would be the effective
date of acceptance under the proposed default rule. The letter of
revocation received by Offeree was too late to have any legal effect
under any existing default rule because the contract was formed
either on May 7 upon dispatch or on May 10 upon receipt. 08
In Example One, the various rules yield the same result: the
revocation is ineffective. The acceptance would be effective upon
dispatch only under the existing common law rule. The acceptance
would be effective upon receipt using the United Nations Conven-
tion, the Model EDI Trading Partner Agreement and the proposed
default receipt rule. A slight variation of Example One creates a
more difficult and more uncertain analysis.
Example Two: Offer - Acceptance Sent - Revocation Re-
ceived - Acceptance Received
On May 1, Offeror sent the offer On May 5, Offeree received
the offer On May 7, Offeree mailed the acceptance. On May 8,
Offeror faxed Offeree a revocation of the offer, which was received
by Offeree within moments of dispatch. On May 10, Offeror
received Offeree's acceptance.
According to the existing default dispatch rule, a contract was
formed on May 7 when Offeree mailed the letter of acceptance to
Offeror.2 9 The dispatch of the acceptance essentially makes the
offer irrevocable"' 0 so that the revocation has no legal effect even
though it was received by Offeree before Offeror received the
acceptance. A contract, likewise, would have been created if the
Uniform Commercial Code applied."'
Curiously, the result, but not the analysis, would be similar
under the United Nations Convention."2 As previously discussed,"'
under the Convention a contract is 'created when an acceptance
becomes effective," 4 and an acceptance becomes effective when
received by Offeror."5 Initially, it would seem, then, that the
contract was formed on May 10, but the revocation received on
107 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
'0 A revocation is effective upon receipt. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 22 and accompanying text, But see Rhode Island Tool Co. v. U.S.,
128 F Supp. 417 (Ct. CI. 1955).
110 See supra note,57 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
112 See U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83 and accompanying text.
"'3 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
I" U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 23.
115 Id. at art. 18(2).
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May 8 would ternnate Offeree's power of acceptance before the
contract was created. A closer reading of the Convention reveals
that although the contract was not created until May 10, the offer
may be revoked only if the revocation reached the Offeree before
he dispatched the acceptance.116 Dispatch of the acceptance makes
the offer irrevocable so that, in Example Two, the contract was
formed on May 10 and the revocation was ineffective. This civil
law default rule approximates the common law mailbox or default
dispatch rule for probably the same reason, which is that Offeree
has relied on the offer by dispatching an acceptance and that
reliance should be protected.
Offeree's reliance was not reasonable. Offeror, unaware that
Offeree dispatched an acceptance, should have been able to revoke
effectively the offer unless the parties agreed to its irrevocability
or a default rule properly made the offer irrevocable. The civil law
and the Convention default rules, by making an offer irrevocable
upon dispatch of the acceptance, do not mirror the expectations
of the parties." 7 If Offeree had wanted the protection of irrevo-
cability, Offeree should have bargained for it or created the con-
tract before he received the revocation."" In Example Two, Offeror
used a substantially instantaneous medium of commumcation in-
stead of the mall because the Offeror most likely presumed that
time was of the essence. Offeree could have done the same.
The proposed default receipt rule would best reflect the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties: a contract would not have been
created because the. acceptance was received by Offeror after Of-
feree received the revocation. The principle is similar to the rule
in the law of security interests: first in time, first in nght."9
With regard to EDI, no issues of continued irrevocability would
have arisen. Simply, under the Model Agreement no document has
legal effect until received by the other party 120 The result under
the Model Agreement would be the same as under the proposed
default receipt rule: no contract was created. The burden on Of-
feror engendered by the existing common law and civil law default
rules is alleviated by the Model Agreement and the proposed de-
26 Id. at art. 16(1).
227 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1990).
11 Agreement, supra note 26, § 2.1, at 1732.
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fault rule. Acceptance as well as revocation will be governed by
time of receipt, not dispatch.
121
Those unhappy with the result under the proposed rule might
argue that, in relying upon the new technologies, the rule places a
Herculean burden on small busines.s operators and individual con-
sumers. However, it is reasonable to expect that these people will
understand that time is of the essence in contract formation.12
Whether the contract is for a multi-billion dollar takeover of an
airline, a ten thousand dollar purchase of hamburger meat, or a
hiring of a rmmmum-wage employee, an offeree would reasonably
expect that his acceptance will have effect only if received by the
offeror before the offeror revokes the offer Moreover, there is no
technology advantage: any offer can be immediately accepted by
simply using a telephone.' 23
Example Three: Offer - Manifestation - Revocation - No-
tification
On May 1, Offeror sent Offeree the offer On May 5, Offeree
received the offer On May 5, Offeree called four different friends
telling them about the offer and saying, "I accept that offer I
want to work for Offeror " Moreover, on May 5, Offeree wrote,
but did not mail, a letter of acceptance to Offeror On May 6,
Offeror faxed Offeree revocation of the offer, which was received
by Offeree within moments of dispatch. On May 7, Offeree mailed
Offeror the letter of acceptance. On May 10, Offeror received
Offeree's acceptance.
In Example Three, Offeree manifested acceptance, but did not
commumcate that acceptance to Offeror until after Offeree received
"I See Report, supra note 91, at 1678.
122 On the matter of new technology and changes in society, Chief Judge Jones wrote:
We are living in a time of change. The theones of yesterday, proved by
practice today, give way to the improvements of tomorrow.
To apply an outmoded formula is not only unjust, it runs counter to the
whole stream of human expenence. It is like insisting on an oxcart as the
official means of transportation in the age of the automobile. The cart served
a useful purpose in its day, but is now a museum piece.
Rhode Island Tool Co., 128 F Supp. at 420.
121 There are more than 120 million telephone lines in this country. Indeed, if nothing
else suffices, there are two million telephone booths in the United States alone. Chicago
Tribune, supra note 62, § 10, at 38.
Detractors might argue that this oral commumcation would raise a Statute of Frauds
problem. However, the agreement is formed at the moment of assent; the Statute of Frauds
serves only to make the existing agreement enforceable. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
CorrRAcTs § 137 (1981). Moreover, an offeree could fax the acceptance. Indeed, many
courts have found that a signed fax document satisfies the writing requirement of the Statute
of Frauds. See Report, supra note 91, at 1684.
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Offeror's revocation. According to the existing common law dis-
patch default rule, Offeree's attempted notification would have no
legal effect in that Offeree must have completed every act essential
to the making of the promise.'l It is essential that, in addition to
his manifestation, Offeree must exercise reasonable diligence to
notify Offeror of that mamfestation. 12 Because Offeree failed to
attempt to notify Offeror, Offeree did not complete his acceptance
before the revocation became effective.1 26 The result would be the
same under the Uniform Commercial Code. 27 According to the
United Nations Convention,' 8 the EDI Model Agreement, 2 9 and
the proposed default receipt rule, an acceptance is not effective
until received; therefore, Offeree's receipt of the revocation ter-
minated his power of acceptance.
Professor Farnsworth proposed that the proper interpretation
of the communication or notice requirement of the existing com-
mon law default rule was that notification merely was a condition
subsequent to the contract that was formed upon an offeree's
manifestation of assent to the terms of the offer. 30 If Professor
Farnsworth's explanation were correct, in Example Three a con-
tract would have been created at the moment of Offeree's mam-
festation of assent on May 5. According to Professor Farnsworth,
Offeror's duty under the contract would have been discharged had
Offeror not received the notice within a reasonable time.' In
Example Three, however, Offeror received the notice and was
bound to perform. Essentially, Professor Farnsworth's analysis
would make Offeror's offer irrevocable as soon as Offeree main-
fested assent. That irrevocability was unbargained-for and created
a windfall for the offeree. 3 2 As in Example Two, Offeree should
,24 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; see also Painter v. Brainard-Cedar
Realty Co., 163 N.E. 57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) (notice by phone after signing effective to
create contract).
126 See, e.g., Lyon v. Adgraphics, Inc., 540 A.2d 398 (Conn. App. 1988) (signature
without commumcation of acceptance was ineffective to create a contract for sale of
business); Sokol v. Hill, 310 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1958) (same for sale of realty); Wilkie v.
Banse, 88 N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1958) (same); Toro v. Geyer, 117 N.E.2d 620 (Ouo Ct. App.
1951) (same for sale of business).
I" See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
"3 F FAsNswoRaT, supra note 4, § 3.14, at 231-234.
"I Id. In that situation, the preferable analysis leads to the conclusion that the offer
lapsed before acceptance.
132 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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have protected his acceptance by using a substantially instantaneous
medium of commumcation. If that had occurred, Offeree's accep-
tance would have reached Offeror within moments of dispatch and
Offeror's revocation would have had no legal effect. Because Of-
feree did not act reasonably, Offeree should not receive the benefit
of irrevocability 133
Example Four: Offer - Manifestation of Acceptance - Re-
jection - Notification
On May 1, Offeror mailed Offeree the offer On May 5,
Offeree received the offer On May 7, Offeree mailed Offeror the
acceptance. On May 8, Offeree faxed Offeror a rejection, which
was received by Offeror within moments of dispatch. On May 10,
Offeror received Offeree's letter of acceptance.
According to the existing default dispatch rule, a contract was
formed on May 7 when Offeree mailed the letter of acceptance.
34
However, the rejection, received by the Offeror before receipt of
the acceptance, may have some legal effect, if Offeror changed his
position in reliance on the rejection. 3 The result would be the
same under the Uniform Commercial Code.
36
The proposed default rule avoids this ambiguity Neither party
would risk acting in reliance upon an incorrect belief about the
existence of a contract. Offeree would know that he did not have
a bargain and would not be bound by an acceptance that might
still be sitting in a mailbox outside his office building. Offeror,
meanwhile, would not risk receiving a faxed rejection only to learn
days later after perhaps forming a contract with another that he
was bound by the mailed acceptance. Example Four illustrates one
of the primary benefits of the proposed rule.
The result would be the same under the United Nations Con-
vention, 37 the EDI Model Agreement,138 and the proposed default
receipt rule: the receipt of the rejection prior to the receipt of the
acceptance would terminate Offeree's power of acceptance. The
"3 In the vernacular, "If you snooze, you lose!"
14 E.g., Mornson v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (contract
complete when acceptance deposited in mail); see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying
text.
13 See, e.g., F FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.22, at 275; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNTRAcrs § 63 comment c (1981).
"4 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
"3 U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, arts. 17 (power of acceptance is terminated when
offeror receives rejection), 18(2) (acceptance effective when received), 22 (acceptance may
be withdrawn if withdrawal is received by offeror before or at the same time as acceptance).
13, Agreement, supra note 26, § 2.1, at 1732.
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uncertainty under the existing common law dispatch rule would be
effectively avoided.
1 39
Example Five: Offer - Acceptance - Acceptance Lost
On May 1 Offeror mailed Offeree the same offer On May 5,
Offeree received the offer On May 7, Offeree mailed the letter of
acceptance to Offeror Offeror never received the letter of accep-
tance and, on May 20, Offeror hired another employee.
According to the existing default dispatch rule, a contract was
formed on May 7 when Offeree mailed the letter of acceptance.' 40
It does not matter that Offeror never received the letter Why is
Offeree and not Offeror protected in this circumstance? As between
the two innocent parties, Offeror bears the burden of commum-
cation failure. According to current analysis, if Offeror had wanted
to ensure receipt of the acceptance, Offeror could have required
receipt of the acceptance as a contingency of the offer 141 Offeror's
failure to expressly require receipt of Offeree's acceptance places
the burden of communication on Offeror. The presumption is that
by mailing an offer to Offeree, Offeror is impliedly authorizing
Offeree to send an acceptance by mail.142 That authorization puts
the onus of communication on Offeror In reality, Offeror has
made no such authorization. Offeror understandably expects to
receive a notice of acceptance from Offeree if Offeree determines
to accept.
It is submitted that as between the two innocent parties, Of-
feror, who never received the acceptance, and Offeree, who ex-
pected that Offeror received the acceptance, Offeree should bear
the burden of communication. How can Offeree ensure commu-
nication? Offeree can telephone or fax Offeror In response, one
"I In a similar circumstance, parties will sometimes reach an oral contract. One party
will write a confirming memorandum (in order to comply with the Statute of Frauds) and
later try to retract the memorandum. Many courts wrongly use the dispatch default rule in
this situation to hold that a contract was made upon dispatch of the memorandum. In fact,
the contract was made at the time of the oral negotiation; the confirmation merely made
the contract enforceable by complying with the Statute of Frauds. Moreover, the retraction
of the signed memorandum has no legal effect because the Statute of Frauds is satisfied as
soon as the writing is signed. See Joiner v. Elrod, 716 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1986) (contract
created when memo mailed); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 137 (1981); see also
American Bronze Corp. v. Streamway Products, 456 N.E.2d 1295 (Ohio App. 1982) (com-
pliance with Statute of Frauds serves only to make enforceable an already existing contract).
'4 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
"I The offeror, as we all know, is the "master of the offer." F FAR swoRTH, supra
note 4, § 3.12,-at 221; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 30 comment a (1981).




might argue that Offeror could have insisted on Offeree's sending
a communication of acceptance by a substantially instantaneous
method of communication. However, if Offeror is unaware of the
existing default dispatch rule, he would not think to include that
stipulation in the offer. The preceding analysis would be the same
under the Uniform Commercial Code.143
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts acknowl-
edge that the existing default dispatch rule is less convenient in
situations such as Example Five in which the acceptance is never
received or is not received within a reasonable time by an offeror 144
The Restatement commentary provides that, in this circumstance,
the language of the offer "is often properly interpreted as making
the offeror's duty of performance conditional upon receipt of the
acceptance."'145 This gloss points out that the courts seem to be
backed into a comer because of the dispatch default rule and
would be better served without the rule. Because most offerors
expect receipt of the acceptance, this artificial interpretation of the
offer would be unnecessary under the proposed default receipt
rule.
If the transaction had involved an international sale of goods
under the United Nations Convention, Offeree's acceptance would
have been effective only when received by Offeror. 146 Since the
acceptance would not have been effective, a contract would not
have been formed. 147 Under the Model EDI Agreement, the accep-
tance, likewise, would have had no legal effect.l
If the proposed default receipt rule were adopted, it would
apply to all transactions. The acceptance, having never been re-
ceived by Offeror, would have no legal effect, and no contract
would be created. This result seems fairer in light of the good faith
and innocent actions of the two parties. If Offeree wanted to ensure
that a contract were formed, Offeree should have used a better
means of communication. Professor Llewellyn argued that the
dispatch rule is justified because, if an offeror does not hear from
an offeree, the offeror would call the offeree to determine whether
the offeree has accepted or rejected the offer 149 Professor Llewel-
,,1 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
'" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 63 comment b (1981).
Id.
"U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 18(2).
'4, U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83, art. 23.
,,I Agreement, supra note 26, § 2.1, at 1732.
49 Llewellyn, supra note 50, at 795 n.23.
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lyn's argument carries weight only in a circumstance in which an
offeror still intends to contract with the original offeree. When an
offeror has found a better bargain, an offeror will merely assume
that the offeree has not accepted, and the offeror will contract
with another. That is exactly what happened in Example Five. As
a matter of human nature, there would be no reason to expect an
offeror to seek out an offeree to ascertain the offeree's intentions
if the offeror does not care about the offeree's intentions. In
addition, a reasonable offeror could conclude that the offeree has
not accepted if the offeror has not heard from the offeree within
the time set by the offeror or a reasonable amount of time. 150 In
that circumstance, the offeror would logically understand the offer
to have lapsed and the offeror would be justified in entering into
a bargain with another party If the offeror had assumed that the
offeree had determined not to accept, unless he truly wanted to
restate the offer, the offeror would not want to communicate with
the offeree merely to find out that the offeree had determined not
to accept. Nobody wants to be rejected more than once.
On the other hand, is there some protection for the innocent
Offeree in Example Five? Offeree did not act reasonably when he
used the mail or some other medium of communication that is not
substantially instantaneous or certain. Offeree could argue that the
Offeror msled Offeree into using the mails. Nevertheless, the law
has evolved so that an offeree need not use the same mode of
communication as that used in the offer.151 In that regard, Offeree
should not be allowed to claim that Offeror authorized Offeree to
use an inefficient method of communication.
Again, the outcome under the United Nations Convention, 52
the Model EDI Agreement 53 and the proposed default rule would
be the same: no effective acceptance and, therefore, no contract.
The acceptance would be effective under the existing common law
dispatch rule.
CONCLUSION
The original rationale for establishing a default dispatch rule
was to allocate the burden of distance. In a world in which a
110 The offer will have lapsed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (1981).
As to when the time for acceptance begins to run, see Caldwell v. Cline, 156 S.E. 55 (W
Va. 1930) (time begins to run upon receipt of offer by offeree).
151 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 30(2), 65 (1981).
152 See U.N.C.I.S.G., supra note 83 and accompanying text.
113 See Agreement, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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message could take days or weeks, either the offeror or the offeree
had to face some period of uncertainty concermng the proposed
bargain. Presumably, the burden was placed on the offeror be-
cause, as "master of the offer,"' 154 the offeror expressly could
change the default rule and make the acceptance effective only
when received. That right to change the default rule could be
exercised only if the offeror knew of its existence. Most offerors,
however, had no reason to know of the rule.
As we enter the twenty-first century, modern methods of com-
mumcation have alleviated the need for the previous allocation of
the burden of commumcation. Mail and telegram are the exception.
Telephone, fax, and EDI are now the common and reasonable
means of commumcation. If the offer and acceptance can be
transmitted in an instant, the situation becomes more like a face-
to-face bargaimng. When the parties bargain in the presence of
each other, no reason exists to excuse the offeree for not ensuring
that the offeror has received the acceptance. Unless otherwise
agreed, therefore, the acceptance in all circumstances should be
effective upon receipt.
1-4 F FARqSwoRTH, supra note 4, § 3.12, at 221; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 30 comment a (1981).
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